We are grateful for comments provided by seminar participants at Vienna University. We are particularly grateful to John Cable for insightful comments and discussion.
Introduction
A commonly held view in the business press is that companies carrying out frequent acquisitions underperform:
Understanding merger cuisine is important as investors re-evaluate companies that became addicted to acquisition in the '90s. Tyco, AutoNation, U.S. Office Products, and AT&T each bought more than 100 companies between June, 1995, and August, 2001 . All have badly lagged their peers' returns.
-Henry, David, 2002, "Addicted To Acquisitions", Business Week, October 14, p.68-72
There is less agreement about why this might be so.
Except for value destruction, acquisition excess doesn't have a single theme. It may afflict the company that does one bad deal as well as the acquisition-hungry buyer that piles up a string of transactions that aren't seamlessly knit into a cohesive whole. It can be the so-called "acquisition machine" that can't thrive without another acquisition because of accounting gimmickries or the realisation that it can't maintain high growth on an organic basis. Or it can be the frequent acquirer that has good strategic intentions but finds itself muscle-bound when it tries to make its asset mix work. There are a number of theories of merger outcomes which can generate an equally wide range of predictions about the pattern of returns for multiple acquirers. These predict that successive acquisitions might have increasingly or decreasingly positive or negative effects on the performance of the acquiring company. These include, for example theories of merger emphasising managerial hubris as a merger motive or diminishing returns arguments (which would predict declining impacts) and learning theories (which would predict improving impacts in successive bids).
In this paper, we examine the general question of whether acquisitions by multiple acquirers have more favourable impacts on the performance of acquiring companies than do single acquisitions. More particularly, however, we ask if the impact of an acquisition on an acquiring company depends upon its place in any sequence of acquisitions undertaken. It is important to distinguish these two questions. The first asks whether on average the impact of the acquisitions made by multiple acquirers is higher than the impact of single acquisitions. The second, given the answer to the first question, asks whether performance impacts on the acquirer decline as successive acquisitions are made. The second question is of interest in itself and from an investment and or strategic management perspective.
We frame our examination of this second question so that it throws light on the alternative theories of possible patterns of acquiring company impacts in successive acquisitions by multiple acquirers.
We assess performance impacts in terms of short and long run share returns and operating performance. Our empirical analysis makes use of a specially constructed dataset covering 1,476 U.K. public firms that carried out over 4,000 acquisitions during [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] . Of these firms 974 carried out more than one acquisition over the period. The acquirers include the most takeover intensive companies of the 1980s and 1990s merger waves such as ICI, Allied Lyons and Hanson Trust
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature and existing empirical evidence on multiple acquirer performance. Section 3 describes the sample and methodology. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
Theory
There are several hypotheses relating to the impact of the number of acquisitions on performance and the sequential performance.
One set of Organisational Learning Hypotheses argue that both the number and order of acquisition will have a positive impact on performance. The organisational learning hypothesis is that there is an "acquisitions learning curve" and that the "experienced acquirer" would be more successful than the less experienced. The most commonly quoted example of this is Cisco's acquisition programme that developed and refined a complete methodology for carrying out acquisitions. The theory predicts that the returns to acquisitions should rise over time. Variations on the organisational learning hypotheses argue that the type of acquisition is important and so there are several learning curves to go down. There could be one for related acquisitions and another for unrelated, one for domestic and another for cross-border, one for public acquisitions and another for private acquisitions. This would mean that the performance effect of any acquisition would depend on how many of that type of acquisition had been carried out previously.
Multiple acquisitions may also result in a sequential improvement in acquirer performance if they bestow upon acquirer companies a sequential increase in market power. For example, Kamien and Zang (1993) show that a sequence of endogenously formed mergers will eventually lead to a monopolization of the industry. However, it can be argued that with the present-day enforcement of competition policy around the world, this Monopolization Hypothesis is a rarely observed phenomenon (Nilssen and Sorgard, 1998) .
There are many possible explanations for the deteriorating performance of merger active firms. The Indigestion Hypothesis argues that the acquirer is unable to successfully integrate subsequent acquisitions because of the short time period between acquisitions. Each subsequent acquisition therefore results in worse performance than the previous acquisition.
Another hypothesis is the Hubris Hypothesis. The worsening performance may be explained by less care being taken with the next merger due to over-confidence drawn from the success of the previous. This could manifest in several ways such as a less careful choice of targets, a higher price paid for those targets, or higher leverage being taken on to pay for subsequent acquisitions. Under this hypothesis, we may expect to observe the decline to be much more acute for acquirers whose initial acquisition is successful. Furthermore, the subsequent acquisitions may tend to be value destructive.
The Diminishing Returns Hypothesis applies the diminishing efficiency of investment schedule to the firm's acquisition programme. It argues that the best opportunities are taken first and so the value derived from subsequent mergers are bound to decline over time. It does not have to be static, but does require that the dynamic creation of new investment opportunities does not keep up with the speed of the acquisition programme. It would predict that the longer the gap between subsequent acquisitions the lower would be the fall in acquisition performance. It would also suggest that the decline in performance would be greater in sectors where the acquisition intensity is highest.
The Overvaluation Hypothesis takes the view that mergers occur when the acquirer is in a good position that is temporary. The acquirer might find that its stock price is high owing to changing market sentiment or some recent (but temporary) good performance. Such acquirers are likely to use equity as their method of payment and are expected to experience a negative decline in long run but not short run performance. Recent empirical papers are consistent with this (Dong et al. (2003) , Ang and Cheng (2003), and Bouwman et al. (2003) ). Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that this applies to multiple acquirers as well as single acquirers. For example, the market may like the acquirer's acquisition activity initially, but this gets a worse reaction over time as the factors that led to the temporary overvaluation decline, or disappear.
The Accounting Manipulations Hypothesis argues that the market may be fooled only initially by the accounting manipulations associated with mergers. As more are done by management thinking that they can get away with it, they are more likely to be found out. One accounting explanation for the declining performance is the PE game that focuses on increasing EPS through purchases of targets with relatively low PE ratios (compared to the acquirer's PE). This popular motive has the qualities of being completely irrational, short-sighted, and unsustainable. For the PE game to raise EPS for the acquirer, the acquirer's PE must exceed the target's PE.
The Merger Programme Announcement Hypothesis explains the decline by saying that on the announcement of the first acquisition the market both reacts favourably to that event and also that it is part of a merger program. This leads to the first acquisition being looked on very favourably. When a second acquisition is announced then there is some announcement gain since it is now a known event, but part of the value was already discounted in the share price. This theory predicts a zero effect on share returns of later acquisitions. It makes no prediction about a decline in profitability associated with subsequent acquisitions.
Empirical Evidence
In terms of the general performance impact of single acquirers compared to multiple acquirers, there have been various studies that have examined the short run returns, long run returns and profit effects. Stegemoller (2001) Rosen (2003) examines the short and long run effects of whether the acquisition is the first acquisition by a sample firm over a three-year period. He finds that the short run reaction is independent of whether the announcement is the first by a firm in the previous three years, but that first time announcers do better than other bidders in the long run. Rosen also finds that the announcement effect is positively related to the firms previous merger announcement effect. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) Multiple acquisitions are clearly the norm for U.K. acquirers. Multiple acquisitions tend to take place frequently, the average time between acquisitions is on average 13 months. We refer to a number of acquisitions by one acquirer as a "series".
Consistent with previous studies that examine the performance of multiple acquirers, we require both a merger clean period before and after a merger series. This approach has the advantage of better identifying when a merger series begins and ends, information that is ideally required by most of the theories used to explain either sequential improvement or decline in merger performance. To be included in the merger clean sample, an acquisition series must be preceded and succeeded by a 36 month period over which no acquisitions are made as a public company. The 36 month length is arbitrary but is consistent with prior studies 3 and evidence that acquisition programs do not usually contain a hiatus of more than 3 years.
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Acquisitions that are previously or subsequently made by acquirers as private companies are not considered to form part of the merger series carried out as a public company. Table 1 provides details on how the full sample changes when we impose our merger clean restrictions. 470 of the full sample acquirers have a gap of more than 36 months between their acquisitions. This means that there are 1,945 acquisition series given that a 36 month period between deals marks the start of a new series. To exclude acquisition series that were preceded by another deal in the previous 36 months we exclude all firms that were both publicly listed in January 1984 and carried out their first acquisition during 1984-86. Column 7 shows that 219 acquisition series (comprising 694 acquisitions) are excluded on this criteria. To exclude acquisition series that were followed by another deal within 36 months of the last sample acquisition, we collect acquisition information on all deals carried out by sample acquirers in 1999-2001 using the same criteria described above. If a merger series is not followed by a another acquisition within 36 months, or until the acquirer is delisted if the period is less than 36 months, then the series forms part of the merger clean sample. Column 8 of Table 1 shows that 242 acquisition series (comprising 653 acquisitions) are excluded on this criteria. The final merger clean sample is shown in Columns 9-10 and comprises 1,486 merger series and 3,019 acquisitions.
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The average time between all the merger clean acquisitions is 7 months.
The disadvantage of requiring clean periods before and after a merger series is that it results in a loss of some 1,325 observations, and may result in a unrepresentative sample limiting the generality of conclusions. To infer the likelihood of any biases introduced into our merger clean sample results, we also run all the following tests for the initial sample of 4,344 acquisitions. The main results and conclusions of this study are extremely robust across both samples. Henceforth, we tabulate only the results using the merger clean sample (henceforth referred to as the sample). Table 2 reports transaction and firm characteristics for the sample. Since these factors have been shown in prior studies to have an impact on performance, it is important to know how they relate to the number and sequence of acquisitions. We group acquisitions according to whether acquirers make one acquisition (single acquirers), two or three acquisitions (moderately acquisitive), or more than three acquisitions (highly acquisitive) and also according to whether the acquisition is first in the series, second or third in the series, or later than third in the acquisition series. Table 2 shows that more frequent acquirers are less likely to acquire public targets.
Transaction and firm characteristics
Single acquirers acquire public targets in 16 percent of cases, whilst for moderately acquisitive and very acquisitive acquirers the figures are 13 and 11 percent. The t-tests for differences between these acquirer types are all statistically significant. There is evidence that moderately acquisitive acquirers are more likely to acquire public targets towards the end of a merger series, but this is not the case for highly acquisitive acquirers for whom the proportion of public deals remains constant throughout the series.
There is little difference between single, moderately acquisitive, and highly acquisitive acquirers in terms of the proportion of cross-border acquisitions carried out, the respective proportions being 0.25, 0.25 and 0.27. There is strong evidence that highly acquisitive acquirers are more likely to carry out cross-border acquirers towards the end of a merger series. For such acquirers, the first acquisition has a 19 percent probability of being cross-border, the 2 nd -3 rd acquisition has a 23 percent probability, and 4 th and greater acquisitions have a 33 percent probability. The difference between the former and the later is significant at the 1 percent level.
However, the same pattern does not hold for moderately acquisitive acquirers, for whom the proportion remains at roughly 0.25 regardless of the order of the acquisition.
The method of payment used in the sample acquisitions does not vary significantly across acquirer types. We classify all payment methods that don't involve a cash element as "noncash", and observe that each acquirer type uses noncash in 47 per cent of acquisitions. There is some evidence that highly acquisitive acquirers are less likely to use noncash methods towards the end of merger series. Such acquirers use noncash methods in 53 percent of first acquisitions compared to 45 percent of 4 th or later acquisitions. This difference is significant, using a t-test at the 10 percent level.
However, there is no evidence of a similar pattern for moderately acquisitive acquirers.
Roughly 40 percent of sample acquisitions involve acquisitions between firms in the same 2-digit SIC code industry, which we classify as horizontal. There is no evidence that this proportion differs significantly according to either the type of acquirer or the order of the acquisition.
30 percent of acquisitions are for firms that are wholly owned by another company and classified as "subsidiary" targets. Once again, there is no evidence that this proportion differs significantly according to either the type of acquirer or the order of the acquisition. 
Long run share returns
We are interested in examining the long run share price performance of our acquisitions, over a maximum 36-month post-acquisition period. In our sample, by construction, a subsequent acquisition will always occur less than 36 months after a previous acquisition. Therefore, if we were to use the 36 month performance for each acquisition, there would be substantial overlap. One of the primary concerns with recent long run methodological papers is the lack of independence in abnormal returns, caused by such overlapping observations. As pointed out by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) , estimating statistical significance with a buy-and-hold methodology is problematic because standard t-statistics do not adequately account for potential cross-sectional dependence in returns. In particular, standard errors will be biased downwards and t-statistics will be biased upwards. Researchers are advised to either employ the Jaffe (1974 ) -Mandelker (1974 Monthly returns are available for 3,019 sample acquisitions. We find that in 322 cases, two different acquisitions by the same firm share the same completion month.
For each of these cases, we only include the post-acquisition performance once (for the first completed acquisition) reducing the sample size by 161. This leaves a sample of 2,858 for which monthly long run returns are calculated.
Despite the removal of overlapping returns, Lyon et al. (1999) still recommend the use of the CTAR method because of cross-sectional dependence in event performance in general. We therefore adopt the CTAR approach. 15 First, we estimate monthly abnormal returns beginning the month following completion through the end of the 36-month period following the completion month, or until another acquisition is completed or the firm is delisted. In each calendar month we form a portfolio of event firms, and take the average cross-sectional abnormal return for that month. The average abnormal return for the entire sample is the time series average. To calculate statistical significance, we adopt the approach of Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and standardise the monthly CTARs by estimates of the portfolio standard deviation. The t-test is then calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the standardised CTARs. This approach controls for heteroskedascity and gives more weight to periods of heavy event activity than low periods because the portfolio residual variance is decreasing in portfolio size, all else equal. 10 To check the robustness of our short-run findings, we also calculated abnormal returns using a CAPM model and a mean-adjusted model (Brown and Warner, 1985) . The results obtained using these alternative methods (not tabulated) were very similar to those obtained using the market-adjusted model and our conclusions identical. 11 For example, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) include the first sample acquisition by sample firms, but exclude the next if it falls within 36 months, and so on. 12 Indeed, our results below suggest that such a technique may cause a systematic upward bias in the average return estimated. 13 Our results are unchanged if we employ the entire 36 month period for each acquisition. 14 We are therefore comparing (both within and across acquirers) returns which are averaged over different time periods. We examined whether the average monthly return differs according to the time period it is measured over by estimating for each acquisition the correlation between the average monthly abnormal return and the time until the next acquisition. The correlation coefficient was insignificant, indicating no relationship between the two. 15 For robustness, we also replicated our tests using buy-and-hold returns. Our results using this alternative method were very similar and our conclusions indentical.
The selection of a proper benchmark is always problematic when examining long run returns. As we saw in Section 3.2, acquirers tend to be large and have high market-to-book value. Our counterfactual approach therefore measures acquirer performance relative to non-acquiring control firms matched on size and market-tobook ratio. The control firms are selected by first dividing all U.K. stocks listed on
Datastream into ten equal sized portfolios based on their market values at the beginning of each calendar year. Those control firms that carried out a sample acquisition within the preceding or subsequent 5 years are then excluded from the matching universe. Each sample firm is then matched with the non-merging firm from its size portfolio that has the closest market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the calendar year. This procedure is repeated for each post-takeover calendar year using a fresh grouping by size decile for the year in question. 16 The control firm approach avoids the skewness and rebalancing biases inherent in a reference portfolio. 
Operating performance
The profitability measure we employ is an operating performance measure defined as operating profit before depreciation and amortisation (Datastream variable 135) divided by sales (Datastream variable 104). We employ sales rather than assets as the denominator because relatively lax accounting rules in the U.K. over the sample period allowed U.K. acquirers to write down the value of assets and increase profitability (Higson, 1998) . 18 To measure the impact of acquisition we calculate the difference between the financial year prior to acquisition (t-1) and the financial year (t+1) which follows the financial year of acquisition completion (t). The latter year is excluded from the analysis. Using a relatively short term measure reduces the problem of overlapping measures for serial acquirers.
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This performance measure is available for 2,330 of the 3,019 sample acquisitions.
However, there are 924 cases where the operating performance measure of different acquisitions by the same firm completely overlap because they are completed in the 16 If a control firm dies within the year, we replace the returns from the month of exit with the returns of the next nearest firm in terms of market-to-book ratio within the particular size decile at the beginning of the year in which the exit took place. If this control firm dies then we use the next closest firm, and so on. 17 Examination of the distribution of abnormal returns revealed no evidence of skewness (skewness statistic -0.47), and therefore no need for skewness adjusted t-tests. 18 To check the robustness of our results we also employed total assets as the denominator in the operating performance measure instead of sales. Our results (not tabulated) were very similar and our conclusions unchanged. 19 We also carried out the analysis using a three year post-acquisition period. Our results were unchanged by this alternative method.
same financial year. For each of these cases, we only include the change in operating performance once (for the first completed acquisition) reducing the sample size by 462. This leaves a sample of 1,868 for which changes in operating margin are calculated.
The problem of cross-sectional dependence applies to our operating performance measure just as it does with long run share returns. The approach we adopt is therefore very similar to that outlined in Section 3.22 above. In each calendar year we form a portfolio of event firms, and take the average cross-sectional profit difference for that year. The average abnormal measure for the entire sample is the time series average. To calculate statistical significance, we standardise the annual profit difference by estimates of the portfolio standard deviation. The t-test is then calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the standardised profit difference.
The counterfactual measure we employ is the median firm in the same industry as the acquiring firm. The industry is defined as Datastream Level 4 Industry Classification, which is based on the FTSE Actuaries System and contains 38 industrial groupings. Therefore the profit difference is measured relative to the median firm in the acquirer's industry.
4 Empirical findings
Univariate results
We carry out univariate analysis to examine the impact of the number and order of acquisition on acquisition performance. The results are reported in Table 3 .
We firstly consider the short run announcement returns. CAR is positive for all major groups of acquirers (single, multiple, and the two subgroups of moderately acquisitive and highly acquisitive), but CAR diminishes steadily as we go from single acquirers to highly acquisitive firms. Furthermore, there are interesting patterns of declines in CAR as acquirers engage in more mergers. For example, highly acquisitive firms (more than 3 mergers) have significantly lower CAR (0.37) than do firms with only one acquisition (t = 2.26). Similarly, highly acquisitive firms incur steady declines in CAR as merger frequency increases. Decline in CAR between the 2 nd deal and beyond 3 rd deals is significant (t = 1.98), as it is also between 1 st deal and beyond 3 rd deals. Thus, highly acquisitive firms show strong patterns of declining CAR as the number of mergers engaged in increases. This same pattern is also seen with the more broadly defined multiple acquirer set of firms. The CAR on the first deal declines from a significantly positive of 0.98 to negative 0.11 for deals beyond the 3 rd merger (t = 2.98). Therefore, declining announcement returns are observed for subsequent mergers by firms with 2-3 mergers as well the highly acquisitive firms with 4 or more mergers. These declining but non-negative announcement returns provide support for the "diminishing returns hypothesis" that suggests firms acquire the best targets first and subsequently less attractive, but still value enhancing targets.
In contrast to the short run returns, the overall impact of the number of acquisitions on the long run returns is less positive. Single merger firms and multiple merger firms both exhibit insignificant CTARs of -0.24 and 0.04, respectively. However, highly acquisitive firms demonstrate a decline in CTAR with subsequent mergers.
The first merger has a statistically positive return of 1.05 whereas mergers beyond the 3 rd have a return of -0.43, and this difference is statistically significant (t = 3.53). The same pattern of declining returns is also found for those firms with only 2-3 acquisitions. That is, even the less active multiple merger firms incur declines in CTAR from 0.33 in the first merger to -0.43 in the next merger or two, a statistically significant decline (t = 1.99). The same pattern is observed for the broadly defined multiple merger set of firms as well. As with announcement returns, acquisitions occurring later in an acquisition series experience lower long run returns than those occurring earlier in the series. Long run returns, like short run returns, reflect lower returns from subsequent mergers in all acquisition series (multiple, moderately acquisitive (2-3), and highly acquisitive (4 or more).
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Changes in operating profit margins show one major difference from announcement returns and long run returns: multiple acquirers outperform single acquirers. The profit margin for multiple acquirers is 0.50 and for single acquirers is -0.17, a significant difference at t = 1.97. However, in all other respects, the profit margin results closely mirror those found with the stock metrics. Performance declines in each merger series for firms with multiple mergers, both moderately acquisitive firms and highly acquisitive firms. Moderately acquisitive firms see statistically positive profit margins of 1.27 on their first deal decrease to 0.05 for the next merger or two (t = 3.24). Highly acquisitive firms go from a positive profit margin on the first merger of 3.53 to a negative profit margin on mergers later in the series. This difference is highly significant with t = 4.69.
We summarise the main univariate findings thus far as follows. Performance of single and multiple acquirers is sensitive to the metric used. Announcement returns are higher for single acquirers than multiple acquirers, but long run returns and changes in profit margins are lower for single acquirers than multiple acquirers. Thus, the market's initial reaction is generally more optimistic than long run performance measured by CTAR or profit margins. Value enhancing mergers at announcement end up being, on average, value neutral for acquirers. Most importantly, a pattern robust to all performance measures is the decline in performance associated with acquisitions occurring later in the acquisition series. We now investigate whether this pattern is robust in a multivariate framework and explore the reasons for the pattern.
Multivariate results
In this section we examine the impact of the number and sequencing of acquisitions on acquirer performance using multiple regression analysis. Specifically, we run a cross-sectional regression for each calendar month (year) of the sample period, where the dependent variable is the monthly abnormal return (annual operating performance change). Coefficient values are estimated using the average values of the monthly (annual) coefficients. Statistical significance is calculated by standardising the monthly (annual) regression coefficients by that particular month's (year's) standard error. The t-statistic is then calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the standardised coefficients. 20 For all regressions our explanatory variables include the transaction variables examined in Section 3.2 above. For the operating performance regressions, we include the variable OP t-1, which is the abnormal operating performance in year t-1. We include this to control for the welldocumented mean reversion in operating performance. acquisitions.
The impact of the number of acquisitions on performance
In the announcement returns regression the dummy variable for multiple acquirers is negative and statistically significant, as is the number of acquisitions. Both of these results are consistent with the univariate results. There is therefore evidence that in the short run, a greater number of acquisitions result in lower returns on average.
Similarly, we confirm other findings (Conn et al. 2004 ) that announcement returns are lower in public mergers than in private mergers, while returns are positively related to method of payment by noncash and also when the target is a subsidiary.
In the long run return regressions the multiple acquirer dummy is negative but not statistically significant. The number of acquisitions variable is also insignificant.
There is therefore no evidence that the number of acquisitions carried out has any impact on long run share returns.
In the operating performance regressions both the multiple acquirer dummy and the number of acquisitions variable are positive and statistically significant. Most of the number dummies are positive and significant also.
To summarise, multiple acquirers experience somewhat lower announcement return than single acquirers but longer run returns are unrelated to number of acquisitions. Multiple acquirers experience significantly higher operating performance changes than single acquirers.
The impact of the sequence of acquisition on performance
To examine the impact of the sequence of acquisition on performance we run two different regressions for each performance measure. The first regression includes a bid order variable, which as described above is the order of the acquisition in the acquisition series. The other regression includes a bid proportion variable that is the number of the acquisition in the series divided by the total number of acquisitions in the series. All regressions include dummy variables for the number of acquisitions carried out. It is important to control for the number of acquisitions since as we saw above, the decline in performance is not independent of the number of acquisitions.
Furthermore, since the number of acquisitions has an impact on acquirer performance, not controlling for it could reflect in a spurious impact of the bid order variable. Table   5 reports results from these regressions.
In the announcement return regression the bid order coefficient is negative and significant. Our conclusion is that the bid order has a significantly negative impact on announcement returns. The bid proportion variable is significantly negative also. In the long run return regressions, the bid order coefficient is significantly negative. The same is the case for the bid proportion coefficient. In the operating performance regressions, the bid order variable and bid proportion variables are both significantly negative.
The dummy variables for number of acquisitions now show that once we control for bid order, there is no longer a negative impact of bid number over the announcement period. Our multivariate results show that there is a significantly negative relationship between bid order and acquisition performance. The results so far are inconsistent with the general learning hypothesis. Only in the case of operating performance do we find evidence that acquirers carrying out more acquisitions do better on average than acquirers doing less. Furthermore, there is strong evidence that performance declines rather than improves with each subsequent acquisition.
Furthermore, decline is also experienced in terms of operating performance, inconsistent with the merger programme announcement theory that only predicts a decline in announcement returns, and inconsistent with the overvaluation hypothesis which only predicts a decline in share returns.
Exploring the reasons for the sequential decline
In Section 2 we outlined several reasons why merger performance may deteriorate over time. We now test whether these hypotheses can explain our finding of significant decline with bid order. We do this primarily by including interactive dummies in the regression analysis employed in Table 5 , with bid order rather than bid proportion as an explanatory variable.
We test whether the decline in performance is more marked for acquirers with high merger frequency in several ways. Firstly, we examine whether there is a decline in performance for acquisitions that are more than 36 months apart. We do this by comparing the last acquisition of the first acquisition series with the first acquisition of the second merger series for the 263 acquirers that have two or more merger series.
The results, not tabulated, show that the difference is negative but insignificant for short and long run share returns, and positive but insignificant for profit change. We conclude that the decline in performance does not occur for acquisitions that are more than 36 months apart. Secondly, we include a dummy variable set equal to one if the time between each acquisition in a merger series is not less than 12 months, zero if it is. To test whether the bid order effect is less pronounced for such acquirers, we include an interaction dummy which is equal to the bid order if the dummy variable is equal to one.
To test whether the decline is less marked for acquirers that experience an unsuccessful first acquisition, for each performance measure we sort our sample of acquirers according to whether the first acquisition in the merger series is unsuccessful or not. We classify the first acquisition as unsuccessful if for a particular performance the first acquisition results in a negative measure. We include a dummy variable set equal to one if it is successful, zero otherwise. Once again, to test whether the bid order effect is lower for such acquirers, we include an interaction dummy that is equal to the bid order if the dummy variable is equal to one.
There are several predictions associated with the diminishing returns hypothesis.
One is that the decline will be more marked for acquirers whose industry is more merger intensive, since the number of potential targets is lower than in other industries. Our measure of merger intensity is the number of sample acquisitions carried out by acquirers in each sector, divided by the number of publicly listed firms in each sector in January 1984. The sector measure we use is the Datastream level 4 measure which is based on the FTSE Actuaries Industrial Classification and comprises 38 separate industries. The measure ranges from a low of 0.77 in the steel and other metals industry (39 acquisitions, 30 public firms) to a high of 9.58 for health organisations (115 acquisitions, 15 public firms), and has a median of 2.23. To test the hypothesis we include a dummy variable set equal to one if for each acquirer the industry intensity is less than 2.23, zero otherwise. 21 To test whether the bid order effect is lower for such acquirers, we include an interaction dummy that is equal to the bid order if the dummy variable is equal to one.
We test the overvaluation hypothesis by identifying acquirers that are more likely to be overvalued. In particular, we hypothesise that overvalued acquirers will, at the time of their first acquisition, have high MTBV relative to other firms (MTBV deciles greater than decile 5) and will use a noncash method of payment for their first acquisition. 22 To test the hypothesis we include a dummy variable set equal to one if this condition does not hold, zero otherwise. To test whether the bid order effect is lower for such acquirers, we include an interaction dummy that is equal to the bid order if the dummy variable is equal to one.
The results from the regression analysis are reported in Table 6 .
The coefficient for the dummy variable set equal to one if not all acquisitions are within 12 months of the previous deal is negative and significant for the announcement return and operating margin regressions. This indicates that acquirers that carry out each acquisition within 12 months of the previous one perform better than other acquirers. This is the opposite to what one would expect from the merger indigestion hypothesis. However, the interaction coefficient for the 12 month dummy is positive and significant for the same performance measures. This indicates that performance decline is less pronounced for acquirers that do not carry out each acquisition within 12 months of the previous one. However, our conclusions are tentative since we find no such evidence for the long run returns regression, for which both the coefficients are small and insignificant. This finding is consistent with the merger indigestion hypothesis, but also the other hypotheses which predict a decline in performance with subsequent acquisitions. For example, the hubris and diminishing returns hypotheses also predict a greater decline the shorter the time difference between acquisitions.
The coefficients for the unsuccessful first acquisition are significant for each performance measure. The dummy variable is significantly negative, indicating that an unsuccessful first acquisition, on average, results in a significant negative impact overall. 23 The interaction dummy is significantly positive, indicating that those acquirers doing an unsuccessful first acquisition subsequently experience an improvement in performance rather than the decline experienced by successful first 22 The finding in Table 2 that cash deals are more likely towards the end of merger series is consistent with this explanation. 23 This does not appear to be driven by the performance difference for the first acquisition. In additional tests we find that the last acquisition by successful first acquirers results in significantly better performance than the last acquisition by unsuccessful first time acquirers (across all performance measures).
time acquirers. This finding is consistent with at least two alternative hypotheses;
hubris, and mean reversion in takeover performance. Initial success in an acquisition series could promote hubris with the unfortunate result of decline in performance of subsequent mergers. This could occur for several reasons such as less care being taken with respect to subsequent mergers, or a higher premium being paid. To test the hubris hypothesis, we examine whether successful first time acquirers actually underperform in the last acquisition of their series. However, we find no evidence of this. Despite the decline in performance to successful first time acquirers, such acquirers do not experience significantly poor acquisitions at the end of the series.
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In contrast to the hubris argument, the mean reversion argument argues that acquirers that initially do well at acquisition are unable in subsequent acquisitions to maintain the above average takeover performance.
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The coefficients for the merger intensity variables are statistically insignificant throughout. There is therefore no evidence that performance decline is more pronounced in industries with high merger activity, as one could arguably expect with the diminishing returns hypothesis. 26, 27 Similarly, the coefficients for the overvaluation variables are statistically insignificant throughout all regressions.
We also carried out tests of the PE hypotheses and the learning hypothesis but found no evidence in favour of either. To test the former, we compare the ratio of the buyer's PE and seller's PE to see if it is greater than one, following Rau and Vermaelen (1998) . PE data on acquirers was obtained from Datastream at the end of the calendar year prior to the acquisition announcement. The PE ratios of targets are obtained from Acquisitions Monthly and SDC and are calculated as the transaction value divided by earnings in the year prior to acquisition. For acquirers and targets we exclude all negative PE ratios. PE data for both acquirers and targets were available for 1,155 sample acquisitions, of which 103 were single acquirers and 571 multiple 24 We carry out several further tests of the hubris hypothesis. We find no evidence that the bid premium paid in acquisitions of public targets increases with bid order when the first acquisition is successful. We also find no evidence that leverage increases more with subsequent acquisitions when the first acquisition is successful. 25 We find no evidence that this finding is due to mean reversion in overall firm performance. Firstly, the announcement return decline is inconsistent with this explanation. Secondly, we sort acquirers on prior share return performance and prior operating performance, but find no evidence that merger performance decline is significantly higher for acquirers with high prior performance. 26 In additional tests, we found no evidence that the decline in performance was more highly correlated with merger intensity for the subsample of horizontal mergers. Once again, the merger intensity coefficients were statistically insignificant. 27 A further prediction of the diminishng returns hypothsis is that the decline in performance would be more pronounced for industries with lower growth potential. To test this prediction, we carried out the regressions in Table 5 for subsamples of low and high growth industries (measured by acquirer industry average sales growth over . However, we found no significant difference between these subssamples of acquirers.
acquirers for which PE data existed for 1,052 acquisitions. For each of these 571 multiple acquirers we estimate the average acquirer PE / target PE ratio across all acquisitions. To test the hypothesis we include a dummy variable set equal to one if the ratio is less than one, zero otherwise. To test whether the bid order effect is lower for such acquirers, we include an interaction dummy that is equal to the bid order if the dummy variable is equal to one. The results, not reported for brevity, show that coefficients for both variables are no different from zero. We therefore find no evidence that acquirers that are more likely to be playing the PE game experience a higher decline in performance than other acquirers.
We also test whether there is a specific learning effect associated with particular kinds of acquisition: according to the nationality of the target, the organisational form of the target, and the industrial direction of the acquisition. For each of these characteristics, we create a dummy variable set equal to one if 75 percent of an acquirer's acquisitions are the same (i.e. cross-border or domestic), zero otherwise. To test whether the bid order effect is lower for such acquirers, we include an interaction dummy that is equal to the bid order if the dummy variable is equal to one. The coefficients for these variables are statistically insignificant for both the full and merger clean samples. A similar test based on the number of that type of acquisition carried out so far, resulted in similar results. We therefore find no evidence that there is a learning effect associated with these particular types of bid, or that our bid order effect is affected by such effects.
5 Conclusions
Our conclusions may be simply summarised.
We may begin with short period returns. On a univariate basis we find that short run announcement returns are positive for all classes of acquirer. They are highest for single acquirers as a group and fall as the acquisition frequency rises. In a multivariate context we find that given the number of acquisitions carried out, the bid order (and the bid proportion) has a significantly negative impact on announcement returns.
As far as long run returns are concerned we find that on a univariate basis the share return performance of both single merger firms and multiple merger firms is unaffected by acquisition. However, both moderately and highly acquisitive firms do demonstrate a decline in these returns with subsequent mergers. These results do not hold in a multivariate context. Thus in the long run multivariate regressions the multiple acquirer dummy and the number of acquisitions dummy are both negative but not statistically significant. There is therefore no evidence that the number of acquisitions carried out has any impact on long run share returns. However we do find that given the number of acquisitions the bid order coefficient is significantly negative. The same is the case for the bid proportion coefficient. Therefore whereas the total number of acquisitions doesn't matter the order in any sequence does.
The results for profit margins are somewhat different. Here we find that on a univariate basis multiple acquirers outperform single acquirers. Highly acquisitive firms go from a positive profit margin change on the first merger to a significantly lower and negative profit margin impact for acquisitions later in the series. However in a multivariate context the number of acquisitions has no impact on returns but
given the number of acquisitions we find that the bid order variable (and bid proportion variable) is significantly negative.
Taken as a whole these results demonstrate that there is a significantly negative relationship between bid order and acquisition performance. We then explored more closely for multiple acquirers the relationship between the success or otherwise of the initial merger in the sequence and the impact of later acquisitions.
We found that on average an unsuccessful first acquisition results in a significant negative impact overall. Those acquirers doing an unsuccessful first acquisition subsequently, however experience an improvement in performance rather than the decline experienced by successful first time acquirers. They learn from their mistakes but they never catch up. It appears that if at first you don't succeed you never will catch up. Thus, acquirers that do successful first acquisitions experience a significantly more positive "final" acquisition than unsuccessful first time acquirers across all performance measures. On the other hand having a successful first merger is a clear predictor of future declining impacts. Despite this decline in performance however they do not experience significantly poor acquisitions at the end of the series and remain overall a more successful group than first time unsuccessful acquirers. If at first you succeed you will go on doing so albeit with diminishing impacts.
We tested various other explanations for the decline in takeover performance. We found some evidence that the decline is more marked for acquirers whose acquisitions all occur shortly after previous acquisitions. We rejected the merger intensity and overvaluation hypotheses and also found no support for the PE magic hypothesis. We found no support for learning effects associated with particular kinds of acquisition based on the nationality of the target, the organisational form of the target, or the industrial direction of the acquisition. The generally declining impacts associated with later sequence order is inconsistent with a learning hypothesis except in the case of unsuccessful first acquirers who however never quite learn enough to catch up.
Overall we are therefore left with explanations based on either hubris, mean reversion in takeover performance, or diminishing returns to explain the patterns we observe. Table 1 Full sample and merger clean sample Table 3 Acquisition performance by acquisition number and order Announcement stands for daily announcement period cumulative abnormal returns calculated over the period -1,+1, where 0 is the announcement day. The abnormal return is calculated relative to the Market Index. Long run stands for the mean calendar time abnormal share returns, calculated from the month following completion through the end of the 36-month period following the completion month, or until another acquisition is completed or the firm is delisted. They are calculated with respect to control firms matched on size and market-to-book ratio. Calendar months with less than 5 observations are excluded from the analysis. Statistical significance is calculated by standardising each monthly average calendar time abnormal return by the monthly portfolio standard deviation. The t-test is then calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the standardised calendar time abnormal returns. Operating margin stands for the change from t-1 to t+1 in operating profit divided by sales. Year t is the accounting year following the completion of the acquisition and is excluded from the analysis. This measure is calculated in calendar time relative to the median industry firm. Calendar years with less than 5 observations are excluded from the analysis. Statistical significance is calculated by standardising the annual operating margin by estimates of that year's standard deviation. The t-test is then calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the standardised operating margin. For all measures, acquisitions are removed for a particular performance measure if the performance measure for that acquisition is measured over the identical time period to the previous acquisition by the same acquirer. Number of observations are in parentheses. a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively, using a two tailed test. Table 4 Regressions of takeover performance on acquisition number
Columns entitled "Announcement " report results from cross-sectional ordinary least squares regressions, where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal share return for acquirers over the announcement period, the calculation of which is described in Table 3 . Columns entitled "Long run" report results from a series of cross sectional ordinary least squares regressions that are estimated for each month of the sample period, where the dependent variable is the post-bid monthly abnormal return, the calculation of which is described in Table 3 . The reported coefficients are the averages for all months. Statistical significance is calculated by standardizing the monthly regression coefficients by that particular month's standard error. The t-statistic is then calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the standardized coefficients. The reported adjusted R 2 are the averages from the monthly regressions. Columns entitled "Operating margin" report results from a series of cross sectional ordinary least squares regressions that are estimated for each year of the sample period, where the dependent variable is the abnormal change in operating performance from t-1 to t+1, the calculation of which is described in Table 3 . The reported coefficients are the averages for all years. Statistical significance is calculated by standardizing the annual regression coefficients by that particular year's standard error. The t-statistic is then calculated using the mean and standard deviation of the standardized coefficients. The reported adjusted R 2 are the averages from the annual regressions. Operating margin t-1 is the abnormal operating performance in year t-1. Multiple acquirer is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer carries out more than one acquisition, zero if the acquirer carries out only one acquisition. Number of acquisitions is the number of acquisitions carried out by an acquirer. Acquisition No 2 (3, 4, 5-9, 10+) is a dummy variable that equals1if the number of acquisitions carried out by an acquirer is 2 (3, 4, between 5 and 9, 10 or greater), zero otherwise. Other explanatory variables are as described in Table 2 . a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively, using a two tailed test. Table 5 Regressions of takeover performance on acquisition number and acquisition sequence
Regression methodology and variables are described in Table 4 . Bid order is the number of the acquisition in the acquisition series. Bid proportion is the number of the acquisition in the series divided by the total number of acquisitions in the series. Acquirers carrying out only one acquisition within a series are excluded. a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively, using a two tailed test. Table 6 Regressions of takeover performance on acquisition series characteristics
Regression methodology and variables are described in Tables 4 and 5 . The other variables are described in the text. Acquirers carrying out only one acquisition within a series are excluded. a, b, c Significantly different from zero at the 1, 5 and 10% levels respectively, using a two tailed test.
